In Chadwick v. Duxbury Public Schools, 475 Mass. 645 (2016), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) declined to recognize the existence of a “union member-union” privilege within M.G.L. c. 150E (collective bargaining statute), and declined to create such privilege under common law. While conceding that a union member-union privilege has never been recognized in Massachusetts, the plaintiff, Nancy Chadwick, argued that c. 150E should be interpreted to recognize such a privilege and that the privilege barred access to certain discovery requests made by Duxbury. Chadwick sought a privilege “that would protect from disclosure to employers communications between public sector employees and their unions when made (1) in confidence; (2) in connection with bargaining or representative services relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings; (3)between an employee (or the employee’s attorney) and union representatives; or (4) by union representatives acting in official representative capacities.” The decision affirms an earlier ruling by the superior court rejecting the plaintiff’s claim and ordering production of the requested discovery.
At issue were communications between Chadwick and union representatives, or among union reps acting in their official capacities. Duxbury requested these communications in defense of the civil lawsuit filed against them by Chadwick, alleging discrimination and retaliation. Chadwick objected to Duxbury’s requests and withheld dozens of emails from disclosure on the basis of union member-union privilege. Duxbury filed a motion to compel production, since no such privilege exists in Massachusetts.
The Court’s decision distinguishes between proceedings arising out of the collective bargaining context, and civil lawsuits brought by individual employees. “
